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almost in a state of anarchy. Religion lacks unity, firmness, consciousness of its own convictions and aims. The theory of political and social organization is "all in the air." It is only in the exact sciences, technology, and industry, that we find coherence and unity of purpose and aim. Simplicity of data and poverty of aims secure for these disciplines their triumphant success.

A new culture is in travail, and philosophy shares in the travail. We can not clearly see the outcome until it arrives, but, in the meantime, to bring the work of the past to bear on the problems of the present seems to me to be one of the most indispensable ways by which philosophy can prepare itself to do its work in helping to self-conscious unity of expression and aim the new culture that is on the way. It is equally indispensable, of course, that the philosopher should sound the living movements of literature, morality, political and social organization, and religion, as well as the positive sciences. The study of historical evolution and the contemporary situation should quicken and illuminate one another.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Ethical Aspects of Evolution Regarded as a Parallel Growth of Opposite Tendencies. By W. BENETT. Oxford. 1908.

This book, while on the whole well informed and well written, showing considerable originality, too, and being constantly stimulating and suggestive, is somewhat outside the pale of technical philosophy both in its manner and in its sophistication, and, accordingly, it may fail to appeal to such philosophers as strongly insist on their merely professional tests. Aside, however, from the refreshment that always comes with a little informality in the manner of a book, especially if literary grace and ordinary good sense are present, and aside also from the fact that in these latter days a certain informality has characterized a good deal of reputable and often important philosophical literature, the book here in review certainly supports a thesis and makes an important application of a thesis which nowadays can not have too much attention from all thinkers. Thus, Mr. Bennett has put himself plainly in the company of those who are assailing the long-entrenched and the strongly-entrenched view that evolution is distinctly a linear process, a movement, whatever its seeming, and, at most, its only occasional set-backs, towards a certain goal. This goal, whether described in terms of coherence and heterogeneity, or in terms of a final perfect adaptation, or of ultimate happiness, or of human or spiritual supremacy, has always implied a gradual reduction of conflict, an ultimate elimination of all opposition. That such a result of evolution was consistent rather with an old-time orthodox theology than with the

positive facts of organic life or with the logical demands of the evolution hypothesis, which certainly forbid any complete and ultimate eliminations, was slow to be recognized, a long-standing habit of mind being apparently too strong to be overcome all at once. But at last such perfectionistic interpretation of evolution is giving way and, among many other things, the consequences to ethical theory are great.

According to Mr. Benett, evolution is the "equal and parallel progression of opposites" (p. 6 and Ch. I.) and, as to the absolute end or purpose of evolution, "at least as long as [the equal progression] is maintained it must be impossible to discover that end within the world of experience" (p. 16). A world whose process is always one of well-balanced opposites, such as adaptation and misadaptation (p. 23), pleasure and pain (Chap. II.), known purposes and irreducible anomalies (Chap. III.), life and death (p. 106), individualism and socialism, or self-assertion and obedience (Chap. VIII.), can hardly be said to be moving towards any discovered or discoverable goal. But, although thus without any visible end or direction, the world's process may still be significantly a forward one. "The essential property of forward evolution is increase of force" (p. 65). "The distinctive characteristic of forward evolution is not the elimination of defects, or the acquisition or preservation of advantages, but the parallel development of both defects and advantages, *accompanied by a continually increasing output of energy*" (p. 7, italics mine). And, once more, from the important chapter (VII.) on "Values and Final Causes": "The principle which first suggests itself as the main determinant in all the higher objective values is greatness" (p. 99), and in forward evolution characteristically there is "a continuous increase in all directions in size, and strength, and dominion over external nature, coupled with increased liability to disease and destruction by external nature; higher virtues, and lower depths of wickedness; a vastly increased volume of problems which have been solved, and of problems which await solution; increased simplicity of knowledge and increased complexity; wider generalization and a more minute specialization; increased power of individual action and increased strictness of subordination to the common aims of society" (p. 102). And the increase thus constituting forward evolution and suggesting, not merely an enlargement—intensive as well as extensive—of all the factors of evolution, be these seemingly positive or negative, but also the persistence of an equal conflict, or of equal conflicts, the ratio of opposition plainly remaining always constant, can mean only that the process (1) as involving a persistent balance is subject to a principle of conservation, if not of energy, at least of reality, and (2) as involving the increases has an end or purpose, although not a visible, or in any way determinable, one. The first of these meanings Mr. Benett neglects, but in the second he takes special interest. "Increase," he says, "... can not be regarded as an end in itself, and is only valuable as a means to an end" (p. 11), and the end, accordingly, to which it is a means must be transcendental (pp. 10, 103, *et sæpe*). "The transcendental purpose which the necessities of our existence compel us to assume as the final cause of all things can not be identified with any

human purpose and yet must be such a purpose as is implied in the fact, 'too patent to require proof,' that the increase in all the anomalous elements in our world of experience has been enormous" (p. 104). In other words, the increases and the oppositions, the oppositions and the increases, imply, not a purpose, but a real purposiveness, in general, that is, a transcendental purpose. Even so general a thing as life, ever more life, may not be said to be "the cosmic final end," unless, as few would readily understand such an assertion, life were so generally or so transcendently conceived as to include or imply also death, ever more death, more certain death and more tragic death (p. 106).

So evolution has no assignable end. It may, indeed it does, have its lines, but it is not uni-linear or it is so only transcendentially, that is to say, as I have to understand, only in a way that includes and, with apologies for so much unction, sanctifies all its lines, or at once all its purposes and all its seeming "irreducible anomalies," making every one of these participate immediately in the one purpose. And this conclusion has an important outcome for ethics.

Nor is the outcome, as might be too hastily supposed, fatal to a genuinely teleological view or to a teleological method. On the contrary, although in this paragraph I may be interpreting rather than literally construing or expounding what Mr. Benett has said, it gives teleology a freedom which usually has been denied. Thus Mr. Benett's facts are certainly against a teleological absolutism. They are against the teleology of a uni-linear process. But he insists on the teleological point of view. "Our method . . . must be teleological, and our classification of objects as good or bad must be with reference to a final end which we locate in the future, and not with reference to the chain of past events" (p. 9). But "a purpose that intends everything that happens must be essentially different from human purpose" (p. 10). So Mr. Benett is plainly against any view that, presuming to select and assert some specific end or some ideal perfection as the absolute end, is thus either narrowly empirical or only abstractly and anthropomorphically idealistic *instead of strictly and truly transcendental*; and this position of his involves what I should call a freed or also a perfectly spiritual teleology and what would, at the same time, be quite consistent with experimentalism and even—only save the marks!—with pragmatism and pluralism. Must not the strictly and truly transcendental, whether as purpose or unity, as reason or ground, or as what any of the philosophers will, be wholly free from the limitation or mixture or taint of either isolation or exclusion? Can it be in character and still be aloof from the empirical? Intending everything, does not a truly transcendental purpose give a certain immediate reality and morality to everything, sanctifying, if again I may be forgiven my offensive unction, not only all conscious purposes, but also whatever challenges and opposes such purposes? From the other side, does not experimentalism, do not pragmatism and pluralism, make *the* end or purpose *perfectly* transcendental? Yet how poorly the supporters of these recent isms have seemed to know their own minds, outdoing—as they certainly have with their radical empiricism, and their immediate realism,

and their pluralism—the transcendentalism of certain less courageous contemporaries! But Mr. Benett's pragmatism or perfect transcendentalism—which now should we call it?—is, on the whole, implicit rather than explicit. He does not follow his own leading to its final outcome, although he does, I think, put up some very obvious signs.

To say the least, Mr. Benett claims for ethics—of course for an evolutionary ethics—a wider view, a more comprehensive interest, than the teleological standpoint has usually imparted to it. His freed teleology makes this wider interest possible and natural. "The deeds and desires of men," he says, may be either good or bad, as the processes of nature are sometimes beneficent and at others destructive, but their value-judgments are always such as we might put in the mouth of forward evolution, could that be represented as a person reflecting with approval on his own behavior. The parallel development of adaptation and misadaptation, and the narrowness of the margin by which the organism at all stages of evolution maintains its existence against the hostile forces of decay and destruction, are reflected in the consciousness of man by the parallel *growth* of good and evil" (p. 16, italics mine). Thus, judgments of value are bound to be more liberal than judgments of what is *morally* good and evil, since the former have regard to what makes for forward evolution, while the latter are under the constraint, not of "the transcendental end," but, more narrowly, of some conscious human purpose relatively to which things are found beneficent or destructive. "It was not their moral qualities which gained for Julius Cæsar or Socrates their assured eminence; and it would be absurd to rule that all men ought to act as they acted. But of the value of their conduct there can be no question . . . [And by] following up this clue we arrive at the first universal dichotomy of ethics. All values fall into one or the other of two classes. They are values either of self-assertion or self-effacement, of ambition or of goodness" (pp. 16-17). If conscience, then, imply a feeling for value relating to the transcendental end, there must always be an opposition between conscience and morality (Chap. V.); and the maintenance of this opposition, but only with growth or increase of its two factors, is essential to forward moral evolution. Conscience, as against morality, would even be made so broad and so deep in its outlook as to see some good, some moral, or at least transcendently, moral good in everything, that is, to find everything which is, right—immediately or transcendently; and, after all, what does this mean, but that, for an evolutionary ethics, since evolution is not uni-linear and since *the* end is transcendental, the law truly is for man, not man for the law, and that all positive morality is experimental? There are always larger values, than those of any line or law, waiting to be realized morally.

So does Mr. Benett interpret evolution ethically, suggesting, as has seemed to me, a moral experimentalism and even, in the sense that he insists on *the* one end being transcendental, a pluralistic teleology. That he does not always follow his own leading to its end I have already suggested, and this I should offer as a criticism of his book. His book, too, gives the impression of a certain aimlessness in its own procedure. The

chapters are stimulating and rather effectively they hammer away at the idea of parallel opposites, but distinct and effective development does not characterize their sequence. The last chapter, on "Measurements," is especially unfortunate in this respect, not merely because it is last, but also because, while possessing much interest and while not irrelevant, formally it is not an organic part of the book.

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My Inner Life, Being a Chapter in Personal Evolution and Autobiography.

JOHN BEATTIE CROZIER. 2 volumes. London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1908. Pp. xiv + 288; ix + 274.

This is a book of unusual interest. It is the autobiography of a philosopher, begun when he was scarcely more than forty (p. 519), and completed while he was still in the prime of life. The story, so far as outward happening is concerned, is singularly uneventful. The boyhood of the author was spent at Galt, a village in the far west of Canada, where he received his education in the local grammar-school, then under the headship of Dr. Tassie, a graduate of Dublin University. Fitted for the university at seventeen (it is characteristic of the author that he does not mention what university) he remained only a week or two, having yielded, much "to the annoyance of his family and the disgust of his old master," to an overmastering fit of homesickness (p. 137). Four years later he returned to take up the study of medicine, which he continued later in London, apparently with considerable success, as he received an offer from a distinguished physician to be his collaborator in "certain scientific investigations," which, if successfully conducted, would have led him almost certainly to a medical lectureship (p. 280). But medicine seemed already too narrow a sphere for one whose imagination had been fired with the glories of universal knowledge. Accordingly, he refused the offer and, practising his profession only so far as was necessary to keep soul and body together, devoted himself to his studies, a record of which forms the major part of the contents of the book. From the exigencies of this hand-to-mouth existence he was delivered by the forethought of a grateful patient who, opportunely dying, left him a legacy sufficient to relieve his immediate necessities (p. 288). Later he bought "an easily worked practise" on one of the estates projected by Lord Salisbury, and there, with the aid of an assistant who relieved him of night work and dispensing, led for ten or twelve years an ideal existence, devoting his mornings to his patients, his afternoons to work in the special hospitals, and his evenings to study (p. 538 sq.). The story of his attempts to gain a hearing for his opinions when he had come to a definite conclusion in his search; of his visits to editors and men of letters; of his publication of a pamphlet at his own expense, the extra copies of which long furnished him with a supply of shaving paper; of the failure of his health and the threatened loss of his eyesight, and of his final success and recognition at a time when long-continued misfortune had all but brought him to despair, is related at length. We hear of a certain young lady who had